

# Aff Answers to Anthro K

1. **Perm: do the plan and the alternative in every other instance - double-bind: either the perm solves or the alt doesn't – if it can't overcome the residual link to the plan, then it can't solve the kritik.**
2. **The alt is vague – they don't tell you what to do or how to do it. Vote AFF:**
  - A) **Skews time because we have to answer every possible interpretation**
  - B) **Kills fairness by creating a moving target which skews 2AC time and strategy**
  - C) **Kills education because it's not supported in the literature**
3. **No Link - Nowhere in our 1AC do we draw a distinction between homo sapiens and all other life – the negative team is the first to do this. Their assumption that we drew the line first turns the K.**
4. **Perm: Do Both –**

- A) **Extinction comes first – resolving human needs is a prerequisite to a rejection of anthropocentrism – the perm is best**

**Eckersley, '98.** ROBYN ECKERSLEY, Professor and Head of Political Science in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia. "Beyond Human Racism." *Environmental Values*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May 1998), pp. 165-182. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30301627> – clawan

Likewise, the **ecocentric moral commitment to the intrinsic value of all beings does not always provide answers to concrete problems**, but it does provide the impetus to search for more inclusive solutions to social and environmental conflict, solutions which seek, wherever possible, a mutual reconciliation of human and nonhuman needs. Without such a commitment, the moral horizons for decision making are narrowed from the start; the dice is already seriously loaded against any genuine attempt to reconcile human and nonhuman needs. The principle of vital needs recognises the distinction between the value of beings and the value of their needs - not in the abstract, but relative to other needs in particular conflicts. When environmentalists favour the survival needs of an endangered species over the recreational or even employment needs of some humans, this does not mean that they value the endangered species more than humans. It simply means that they judge the survival needs to be more urgent and important in the circumstances - especially if the species in question can only adapt to a limited range of habitats. Indeed, it is generally the case that most nonhuman species have a much less flexible response range to environmental changes and stresses than human communities. It must be emphasised here that **the principle of vital needs** - which **stipulates that humans may cause some interference and even killing of nonhuman species, if it is necessary to satisfy vital human needs** - can only be understood in the context of the **primary moral commitment to the worthiness of all beings**. Indeed, **one would be hard pressed to develop guidelines for practical action which are more respectful of the inherent worthiness of all beings unless one moved towards defending a principle of human sacrifice vis-a-vis others species**. However, as we shall see, it is neither necessary nor desirable to take the matter to this extreme if it is accepted that humans are not only moral agents but also worthy moral subjects who are entitled to live and blossom. The attempt to reconcile human and nonhuman conflict by means of a need hierarchy is not unique to deep ecology. James Sterba, for example, has developed a similar need hierarchy as a means of reconciling anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethics based on the distinction between basic and nonbasic needs? Indeed, the distinction between basic and nonbasic needs has been a recurring theme in many varieties of socialist thought and has reappeared in the more general case for 'basic rights' (e.g., Shue 1980). The fundamental intuitive idea is simple: that the more basic and essential human needs should be fulfilled before the more trivial, nonessential needs are met. Behind this idea is the more fundamental moral commitment to the inherent value and dignity of each and every human being. Now Lynch and Wells might be prepared to concede at this point that a hierarchy of needs

(as distinct from a hierarchy of being) is the best way to 'operationalise' ecocentrism and thereby resolve practical environmental conflicts. However, they might still want to insist that a hierarchy of needs is of no help when we face a direct clash of like needs - such as the survival needs of humans versus the survival needs of nonhumans. Indeed, their killing example takes the point one step further, since the vital needs of the moral agent are not in jeopardy. Accordingly, they might still want to argue that, at least in these limited circumstances, we can only resolve the conflict by making a judgment about the relative value of the beings per se, rather than their needs. Now Sterba, has responded to the more general problem of a clash of basic needs by arguing that **since nonhuman species would put their own basic needs ahead of other species, there is no reason why humans should not be allowed to do the same**. He also points out that **if humans were to forego consistently their own survival needs for the needs of other species, they would eventually face extinction - hardly a viable long term strategy for realising an inclusive ethic of ecocentrism**. But, as Stevenson (1996) maintains by way of response, this is an argument based on reciprocity - something that is applicable to relationships between moral agents, but not between moral agents and moral subjects (or 'patients') who lack moral agency. It therefore is not justifiable to apply reciprocity arguments to human/nonhuman relationships. However, it is not necessary to introduce a hierarchy of being to resolve the 'killing scenario' because **implicit in the principle of vital needs, and central to the primary commitment to the intrinsic value of all beings, is a principle of common entitlement on the part of all beings to the earth's bounty**. The principle of common entitlement **makes it clear that humans are not expected to subvert their own basic needs in order to enable other life-forms to flourish**. This is because humans wear two moral hats: they are both moral agents and moral subjects. As moral agents, they have certain responsibilities (not to harm other beings unless necessary to satisfy vital human needs). This is not a responsibility shared by those beings who lack moral agency. However, as moral subjects, **humans also have certain entitlements (to satisfy their own vital needs)**. This is something humans share with all other beings. **To call for human sacrifice for the benefit of nonhuman species is to insist that humans should not be considered as moral subjects at all because they happen to possess moral agency. Such an argument is plainly contrary to the primary value commitment of ecocentrism**.

**B) Individual confrontations of anthropocentrism invariably fail – only by incorporating an ecocentric paradigm into political movements can solves – means the perm is key**

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**The scenario** painted by Lynch and Wells **would have us believe that each of us faces a limited individual moral choice between anthropocentrism or misanthropy** in any head-to-head survival conflict between humans and nonhuman species. Under such circumstances, there is simply no room for a coherent in-between position called non-anthropocentrism. There are several significant factors in the authors' scenario which literally drive us towards this conclusion. These factors relate to the immediacy and inflexibility of the situation, and the solitary circumstances of the rescuer as moral agent. That is, we have no time to reflect on our own or to deliberate with others, we have no alternative means to deal with the situation (all we have is a gun), and we have no forms of assistance from others. This is not a social or political problem; rather it is a matter of individual moral choice. Under such circumstances, we are morally compelled to shoot the animal (the nature of this moral compulsion is explored more fully below). Now it is possible to change the scenario in ways which may lead to very different conclusions. We might, for example, introduce more people into the scenario to provide assistance in dealing with the event, or we might even present the prospect of encountering the wild animal to a group or community of people to reflect upon, deliberate and develop a response plan. Now suppose that the people in this revised scenario care about the fate of other species, not simply as a source of aesthetic delight but also in terms of recognising that other species are entitled to 'a place in the sun', that they are centres of agency, moral subjects (as distinct from moral agents), and that they ought to be allowed to unfold in their own ways. It is then reasonable to surmise that the more people who are involved in anticipating and addressing the problem, the more resources that are devoted to the problem, the more concerted will be the effort, and the greater would be the likelihood that the attack might be minimised or avoided. For example, with help and with different technologies, the moral agent would be in a position to develop a range of different responses which would take away the 'either-or' character of the confrontation. They might find a way of trapping the animal and releasing it, or better still, they may be able to warn the potential victim of how to avoid an attack. Clearly, **possibilities expand when problems are approached collectively and**

democratically rather than individually - and especially so when the participants are motivated by a shared moral concern. When we transform individual problems into social and political problems, then there is invariably a much greater range of potential choices and strategies which may be made in response to any given environmental conflict. How great is that range is partly a function of the depth and strength of democracy in any given community along with the depth and strength of moral commitment towards inclusive responses to environmental conflicts. Indeed Robert Goodin has recently argued that discursive participatory democratic practices are most likely to evoke what he has called 'encapsulated interests', that is the vicarious incorporation and representation of the interests of nonhuman nature in political deliberations (Goodin 1996). The point of playing with the scenario is to emphasise that there is not always a direct correspondence between the individual choices we might make under conditions of extreme urgency and inflexibility and the sort of social morality we might wish to cultivate if given the time and opportunity (although achieving a convergence between individual and social ethics is a desirable goal). In other words, the individual choices we might make in cases of stark moral conflict are not reliable indicators of any systematic discrimination or prejudice on our part (nor, as has been suggested, of the sort of political community we might care to cultivate). For example, just because a man might choose to rescue his dearest male friend ahead of a woman who is a stranger does not necessarily mean that the man is sexist. He might well be actively engaged in political and educational campaigns against sexual discrimination. More generally, choosing to save one's nearest and dearest ahead of a stranger - someone with whom we are not familiar - does not necessarily mean that we are xenophobic. Likewise, just because we as individuals feel compelled to defend our own kind ahead of a nonhuman species in cases of direct, life-and-death conflict does not mean that we harbour systematic prejudices vis-a-vis that nonhuman species. The strong tendency of humans to save the more familiar or the more immediate - those with whom we most identify is first and foremost an expression of our strongest attachments, but it is not necessarily an indicator of our social or ecological prejudices. Identifying who we happen to love the most says nothing about who or what else we might love, or who or what else we might be indifferent towards or despise. Human racism - understood as a systematic prejudice against nonhuman species - can only be revealed when the possibility of reconciliation of human and nonhuman interests and needs is available but is 'nonetheless resisted in the name of advancing human welfare. What might be an appropriate ethic from the point of view of the individual in a stark life-and-death situation can become highly inappropriate when generalised and used to guide social choice. If destroying the habitat of wild species is necessary for the survival of a rural family, then it can hardly be condemned as the unethical thing to do from the point of view of that particular family. But to invoke humanism to support the destruction of old-growth forests (and hence the destruction of nonhuman species) for timber or woodchips when the uses to which those 'forest products' are put are either trivial or can just as well be provided by less environmentally destructive means is an altogether different moral proposition when approached as a question of social choice. What might appear to individuals and families as an environmental zero-sum game may be potentially transformed into a positive sum game when examined as a collective, political problem. Such a transformation may be achieved by developing new technologies, cultivating new social relations, creating new legal relations, critically re-examining human consumption patterns, needs, desires, and re-evaluating and enlarging what passes for human virtues. Again, it is the political refusal to acknowledge that there is 'room to manoeuvre' in so-called environment versus development conflicts which serves to transform what might be a legitimate expression of human survival needs into an illegitimate endorsement of narrow-mindedness, shortsightedness and prejudice. The danger in Lynch and Well's argument is that it may serve as a more general justification for always putting humans first, and as means of legitimising a wide range of environmentally destructive activities - all in the name of the otherwise defensible inclination to 'look after our own'.

## 5. Anthropocentrism is better than biocentrism – it provides a better incentive for ecological preservation.

**Watson 83**, Department of Philosophy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130. Watson is both a geologist and a professor of philosophy. This paper was written at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, where he was a fellow in 1981/82. As the footnotes indicate, the author has depended greatly on the published and unpublished work of George Sessions, whose generous help he very much appreciates. J. Baird Callicott and an anonymous referee also

provided substantive discussion of an earlier draft. (Richard A., "A critique of anti-anthropocentric biocentrism," [//ED](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=enviroethics&id=enviroethics_1983_0005_0003_0245_0256)

There are anthropocentric foundations in most environmental and ecosophical literature. In particular, most ecosophers say outright or openly imply that human individuals and the human species would be better off if we were required to live in ecological balance with nature. Few ecosophers really think that man is just one part of nature among others. Man is privileged—or cursed—at least by having a moral sensibility that as far as we can tell no other entities have. But it is pretty clear (as I argue in "Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature"<sup>36</sup>) that on this planet at least only human beings are (so far) full members of a moral community. We ought to be kinder to nonhuman animals, but I do not think that this is because they have any intrinsic rights. As far as that goes, human beings have no intrinsic rights either (as Naess and Spinoza agree). We have to earn our rights as cooperating citizens in a moral community. Because, unlike many ecosophers, I do not believe that we can return to religion, or that given what we know about the world today we can believe in pantheism or panpsychism, I think it is a mistake to strive for a new environmental ethic based on religious or mystical grounds. And I trust that I have demonstrated both how difficult it is to be fully biocentric, and also how the results of anti-anthropocentric biocentrism go far beyond the limits that ecosophers have drawn. Ecosophers obviously want to avoid the direct implications of treating the human species in the egalitarian and hands-off way they say other species should be treated. It is nice that human survival is compatible with the preservation of a rich planetary ecology, but I think it is a mistake to try to cover up the fact that human survival and the good life for man is some part of what we are interested in. There is very good reason for thinking ecologically, and for encouraging human beings to act in such a way as to preserve a rich and balanced planetary ecology: human survival depends on it.<sup>37</sup>

## **6. A) Human domination of nature is key to space travel and colonization, nanotechnology, solving resource scarcity and poverty, and clean energy – solves overpopulation and subsumes their impacts**

**Zey 01**, sociologist and executive director of the Expansionary Institute (Michael, "Man's Evolutionary Path Into the Universe", *The Futurist*, [//ED](http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/4339216/mans-evolutionary-path-universe)

In a host of ways, dominionization helps humanity vitalize the planet and eventually the universe. As we master the basic dynamics of nature, we are more able to shepherd the evolution of our planet as well as others. As we develop novel and powerful forms of energy, we can rocket from one sphere to another. Moreover, by improving our already formidable skills in moving mountains and creating lakes, we will be better able to change both the topography and the geography of other planets. Examples of dominionization abound. Major macroengineering projects attest to man's [sic] ability to transform the very surface of the earth. By constructing man-made lakes, we will be able to live in previously uninhabitable areas such as interior Australia. Shimizu Corporation envisions a subterranean development called Urban Geo Grid—a series of cities linked by tunnels—accommodating half a million people. In the emerging Macro-industrial Era, whose framework was established in the 1970s and 1980s, we will redefine the concept of "bigness" as we dot Earth's landscape with immense architectural structures. Takenaka, a Japanese construction firm, has proposed "Sky City 1000," a 3,000-foot tower, to be built in Tokyo. Another firm, Ohbayashi, plans to erect a 500-story high-rise building featuring apartments, offices, shopping centers, and service facilities. We will establish dominion over the very heart of physical matter itself. Through nanotechnology, our species will attain control over the atom and its tiniest components. Such control will enable us to effortlessly "macromanufacture" from the bottom up, one atom at a time, any material object. This will enable us to permanently eradicate age-old problems such as scarcity and poverty. We will also establish dominion over our physical realm by mastering the energy production

process. We are on the verge of developing a cheap, accessible form of nuclear fusion for general use, and various companies and government agencies are seriously experimenting with exotic phenomena such as electromagnetism to explore its possible application to energy production. We will travel to the Moon, planets, and asteroids to mine exotic new forms of energy. (The recent successful landing of the NEAR spacecraft on the asteroid Eros presaged the emergence of this new field of exploration.) Organizations such as the Space Studies Institute (www.ssi.org) in Princeton, New Jersey, are drawing up the blueprints for a Solar Power Satellite that will sit in geostationary orbit above the equator, collect cheap and abundant solar energy, and beam it down to Earth in microwave form for land-based energy production and consumption.

## B) Space key to solve human extinction

**Wasser and Jobs 08**, Chairman of The Space Settlement Institute, former CEO of the National Space Society and former member of the AIAA Space Colonization Technical Committee. President of The Space Settlement Institute, (Alan and Douglas, "Space settlements, property rights, and international law: could a lunar settlement claim the lunar real estate it needs to survive?" [//ED](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nss.org%2Fsettlement%2Fmoon%2Flibrary%2FSpaceSettlementLandClaimsRecognition-Wasser2008.pdf&ei=2VraU_imB5CMYATIk4HAAw&usq=AFQjCNGdtNS7480fpVl1iqkRgSijtQEwg&sig2=iDd7QYi-tITVtYHvWZEwSg&bvwm=bv.72185853,d.aWw))

**HUMANITY'S SURVIVAL depends on moving out into the cosmos while the window of opportunity for doing so still exists.** Besides helping to ensure the survival of humankind, the settling of space - including the establishment of permanent human settlements on the Moon and Mars - will bring incalculable economic and social benefits to all nations. The settlement of space would benefit all of humanity. It would open a new frontier, provide resources and room for growth of the human race without despoiling the Earth, energize our society, and as Dr. Stephen Hawking has pointed out, create a lifeboat for humanity that could survive even a planet-wide catastrophe. But, as Dr. Lawrence Risley pointed out, "Exploration is not suicidal and it is usually not altruistic, rather it is a means to obtain wealth. There must be rewards for the risks being taken."

## 7. Extreme anthropocentrism like the alt justifies genocide of persons of disability because of a flawed assignment of moral worth – turns the K

**Lynch and Wells 98**, Professor, Chair of Student Learning (English for Academic Purposes), ELTC. (Tony and David, Environmental Values, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May 1998), pp. 151-163, "Non-Anthropocentrism? A Killing Objection", White Horse Press pp. 156, [//ED](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/30301626?uid=3739728&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104431066187))

There is something particularly horrifying about the kind of ethic which would deny protection to the weakest members of a community, particularly when, on any ordinary understanding, the community is one's own. Even worse it is not an unfamiliar ethic but one with which we are all too familiar: a variation of the view was at work in the eugenic fantasies and concentration camps of Nazi Germany. After all, if there is some kind of hierarchy of moral worth attached to humans, and if some humans are so low on the scale that they are less worthy of moral consideration than some animals, it is only a short step to the proposition that, particularly in an over-populated world, short on universal lebensraum, those who have a limited 'capacity for richness of experience', whether because of some physical or mental disability, should be refused the kind of support which allows them to live, or even positively eliminated, for the greater good of the biospherical net.<sup>18</sup>



## 8. Rejecting anthropocentrism destroys the efficacy of the environmental movement, doesn't translate into effective action, and excludes non-humans from moral consideration, link turning their argument

**Lewis 92**, Associate Research Professor of Geography, Duke University 1992 (Martin W., "Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism", <https://www.dukeupress.edu/Green-Delusions/index-viewby=title.html>)/ED

It is widely accepted that environmental thinkers can be divided into two camps: those who favor the preservation of nature for nature's sake, and those who wish only to maintain the environment as the necessary habitat of humankind (see Pepper 1989; O'Riordan 1989; W. Fox 1990). In the first group stand the green radicals, while the second supposedly consists of environmental reformers, also labeled "shallow ecologists." Radicals often pull no punches in assailing the members of the latter camp for their anthropocentrism, managerialism, and gutless accommodationism--to some, "shallow ecology" is "just a more efficient form of exploitation and oppression" (quoted in Nash 1989:202). While this dichotomy may accurately depict some of the major approaches of the past, it is remarkably unhelpful for devising the kind of framework required for a truly effective environmental movement. It incorrectly assumes that those who adopt an anti-anthropocentric view (that is, one that accords intrinsic worth to nonhuman beings) will also embrace the larger political programs of radical environmentalism. Similarly, it portrays those who favor reforms within the political and economic structures of representative democracies as thereby excluding all nonhumans from the realm of moral consideration. Yet no convincing reasons are ever provided to show why these beliefs should necessarily be aligned in such a manner. (For an instructive discussion of the pitfalls of the anthropocentric versus nonanthropocentric dichotomy, see Norton 1987, chapter II.)

## 9. Double Bind – either humans are morally equal to animals in which exploiting other animals is justified by the laws of nature, or humans are morally superior in which case their framework is silly; either way human domination of animals is legitimate ;)

**Schulman 95**, novelist who wrote *Alongside Night* and *The Rainbow Cadenza* which both received the Prometheus Award, a libertarian science fiction award. (J. Neil, "The Illogic of Animal Rights", <http://www.pulpless.com/jneil/aniright.html>)/ED If human beings are no different from other animals, then like all other animals it is our nature to kill any other animal which serves the purposes of our survival and well-being, for that is the way of all nature. Therefore, aside from economic concerns such as making sure we don't kill so quickly that we destroy a species and deprive our descendants of prey, human animals can kill members of other animal species for their usefulness to us. It is only if we are not just another animal -- if our nature is distinctly superior to other animals -- that we become subject to ethics at all -- and then those ethics must take into account our nature as masters of the lower animals. We may seek a balance of nature; but "balance" is a concept that only a species as intelligent as humankind could even contemplate. We may choose to temper the purposes to which we put lower animals with empathy and wisdom; but by virtue of our superior nature, we decide ... and if those decisions include the consumption of animals for human utilitarian or recreational purposes, then the limits on the uses we put the lower beasts are ones we set according to our individual human consciences. "Animal rights" do not exist in either case.

## 10. Alternative fails – anthropocentrism is inevitable

**Hargrove 03** professor University of North Texas/ Department of Philosophy and Religion (Eugene, "Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value", <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/27903285?uid=3739728&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104425769057>)/ED

I have used the term weak anthropocentrism, rather than simply anthropocentrism, in the title of this paper to help call attention to the fact that not all anthropocentric valuing is instrumental. Without the addition of the word weak, no doubt many nonanthropocentrists would probably conclude that the title contained a typographical error or was a contradiction in terms: "instrumental intrinsic value." While I do not think that labels are important, it is useful to call the view I represent weak anthropocentrism at least until it becomes generally recognized that anthropocentrism does not imply instrumentalism. I do not

think that it is possible for humans to avoid being anthropocentric given that whatever we humans value will always be from a human (or anthropocentric) point of view, even when we try to imagine what it might be like to have the point of view of (or be) a bat, a tree, or a mountain, in my view, we are still looking at the world anthropocentrically – the way a human imagines that a nonhuman might look at the world.

## 11. Biocentrism fails, disincentivizes attempts to stave off human extinction, and re-entrenches anthropocentric thought – turns the Kritik

**Watson 83**, Department of Philosophy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130. Watson is both a geologist and a professor of philosophy. This paper was written at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, where he was a fellow in 1981/82. As the footnotes indicate, the author has depended greatly on the published and unpublished work of George Sessions, whose generous help he very much appreciates. J. Baird Callicott and an anonymous referee also provided substantive discussion of an earlier draft. (Richard A., "A critique of anti-anthropocentric biocentrism," [https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=environethics&id=environethics\\_1983\\_0005\\_0003\\_0245\\_0256](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=environethics&id=environethics_1983_0005_0003_0245_0256))/ED

Nevertheless, it must be obvious to most careful readers that **the general position** characterized in section 1 **suffers from serious internal contradictions**. I think they are **so serious that the position must be abandoned**. In what follows I detail the problems that arise in the system, and then offer an alternative to the call for developing a new ecosophic ethic. To go immediately to the heart of the matter, I take anti-anthropocentrism more seriously than do any of the ecosophers I have quoted or read. **If man is a part of nature, if he is a "plain citizen," if he is just one nonprivileged member of a "biospherical egalitarianism," then the human species should be treated in no way different from any other species**. However, the entire tone of the position outlined in section 1 is to set man apart from nature and above all other living species. Naess says that nonhuman animals should be "cared for in part for their own good."<sup>24</sup> Sessions says that humans should curb their technological enthusiasms to preserve ecological equilibrium.<sup>25</sup> Rodman says flatly that man should let nature be.<sup>26</sup> Now, **the posing of man against nature in any way is anthropocentric. Man is a part of nature**<sup>27</sup> **Human ways**-human culture-and human actions are as natural as are the ways in which any other species of animals behaves. But if we view the state of nature or **Nature as being natural, undisturbed, and unperturbed only when human beings are not present, or only when human beings are curbing their natural behavior, then we are assuming that human beings are apart from, separate from, different from, removed from, or above nature**. It is obvious that the ecosophy described above is based on this position of setting man apart from or above nature. (Do I mean even "sordid" and "perverted" human behavior? Yes, that is natural, too.) **To avoid this separation of man from nature, this special treatment of human beings as other than nature, we must stress that man's works** (yes, including H-bombs and gas chambers) **are as natural as those of bower birds and beavers**. But civilized man wreaks such havoc on the environment. We disrupt the ecology of the planet, cause the extinction of myriad other species of living things, and even alter the climate of the Earth. Should we not attempt to curb our behavior to avoid these results? Indeed we should as a matter of prudence if we want to preserve our habitat and guarantee the survival of our species. But this is anthropocentric thinking. **Only if we are thinking anthropocentrically will we set the human species apart as the species that is to be thwarted in its natural behavior**. Anti-anthropocentric biocentrists suggest that other species are to be allowed to manifest themselves naturally. They are to be allowed to live out their evolutionary potential in interaction with one another. But man is different. Man is too powerful, too destructive of the environment and other species, too **successful in reproducing, and so on**. What a phenomenon is man! Man is so wonderfully bad that he is not to be allowed to live out his evolutionary potential in egalitarian interaction with all other species. Why not? **The only reason is**

anthropocentric. We are not treating man as a plain member of the biotic community. **We are not treating the human species as an equal among other species. We think of man as being better than other animals, or worse, as the case may be, because man is so powerful.** One reason we think this is that we think in terms of an anthropocentric moral community. All other species are viewed as morally neutral; their behavior is neither good nor bad. But we evaluate human behavior morally. And this sets man apart. If we are to treat man as apart of nature on egalitarian terms with other species, then man's behavior must be treated as morally neutral, too. It is absurd, of course, to suggest the opposite alternative, that we evaluate the behavior of nonhuman animals morally. Bluntly, **if we think there is nothing morally wrong with one species taking over the habitat of another and eventually causing the extinction of the dispossessed species-as has happened millions of times in the history of the Earth -then we should not think that there is anything morally or ecosophically wrong with the human species dispossessing and causing the extinction of other species.** Man's nature, his role, his forte, his glory and ambition has been to propagate and thrive at the expense of many other species and to the disruption or, neutrally, to the change-of the planet's ecology. I do not want to engage in speculation about the religion of preliterate peoples, or in debates about the interpretation of documented non-Judeo-Christian-Platonic-Aristotelian religions. I am skeptical, however, of the panegyrics about pantheism and harmonious integration with sacred Nature. But these speculations do not matter. The fact is that for about 50,000 years human beings (Homo sapiens) have been advancing like wildfire (to use an inflammatory metaphor) to occupy more and more of the planet. A peak of low-energy technology was reached about 35,000 years ago at which time man wiped out many species of large animals. About 10,000 years ago man domesticated plants and animals and started changing the face of the Earth with grazing, farming, deforestation, and desertification. About 200 years ago man started burning fossil fuels with results that will probably change the climate of the planet (at last temporarily) and that have already resulted in the extinction of many species of living things that perhaps might otherwise have survived. In 1945 man entered an atomic age and we now have the ability to desertify large portions of the Earth and perhaps to cause the extinction of most of the higher forms of life.<sup>28</sup> Human beings do alter things. They cause the extinction of many species, and they change the Earth's ecology. This is what humans do. This is their destiny. If they destroy many other species and themselves in the process, they do no more than has been done by many another species. **The human species should be allowed-if any species can be said to have a right-to live out its evolutionary potential, to its own destruction if that is the end result.** It is nature's way. This is not a popular view. But **most alternative anti-anthropocentric biocentric arguments for preserving nature are self-contradictory.** Man is a part of nature. The only way man will survive is if he uses his brains to save himself. One reason why we should curb human behavior that is destructive of other species and the environment is because in the end it is destructive of the human species as well.<sup>29</sup> I hope it is human nature to survive because we are smart. But those who appeal for a new ethic or religion or ecosophy based on an intuitive belief that they know what is right not only for other people, but also for the planet as a whole, exhibit the hubris that they themselves say got us in such a mess in the first place.<sup>30</sup> If the ecosphere is so complicated that we may never understand its workings, how is it that so many ecosophers are so sure that they know what is right for us to do now? Beyond the issue of man's right to do whatever he can according to the power-makes-right ecosophic ethic outlined by Naess, **we may simply be wrong about what what is "good" for the planet.** Large numbers of species have been wiped out before, e.g., at the time the dinosaurs became extinct. **Perhaps wiping out and renewal is just the way things go.** Of course, a lot of genetic material is lost, but presumably all the species that ever existed came out of the same primordial soup, and could again. In situations where genetic material was limited, as in the Galapagos Islands or Australia, evolutionary radiation filled the niches. Even on the basis of our present



knowledge about evolution and ecology, we have little ground to worry about the proliferation of life on Earth even if man manages to wipe out most of the species now living. **Such a clearing out might be just the thing to allow for variety and diversity.** And why is it that we harp about genetic banks today anyway? For one thing, we are worried that disease might wipe out our domesticated grain crops. Then where would man be? Another obvious anthropocentric element in ecosophic thinking is the predilection for ecological communities of great internal variety and complexity. But the barren limestone plateaus that surround the Mediterranean now are just as much in ecological balance as were the forests that grew there before man cut them down. And "dead" Lake Erie is just as much in ecological balance with the life on the land that surrounds it as it was in pre-Columbian times. **The notion of a climax situation in ecology is a human invention, based on anthropocentric ideas of variety, completion, wholeness, and balance.** A preference for equilibrium rather than change, for forests over deserts, for complexity and variety over simplicity and monoculture, all of these are matters of human economics and aesthetics. What would it be, after all, to think like a mountain as Aldo Leopold is said to have recommended?<sup>31</sup> It would be anthropocentric because mountains do not think, but also because mountains are imagined to be thinking about which human interests in their preservation or development they prefer.<sup>32</sup> The anthropocentrism of ecosophers is most obvious in their pronouncements about what is normal and natural. **Perhaps it is not natural to remain in equilibrium, to be in ecological balance.** As far as that goes, most of the universe is apparently dead-or at least inanimate-anyway. And as far as we know, the movement of things is toward entropy. By simplifying things, man is on the side of the universe. And as for making a mess of things, destroying things, disrupting and breaking down things, the best information we have about the origin of the universe is that it is the result of an explosion. If we are going to derive an ethic from our knowledge of nature, is it wrong to suggest that high-technology man might be doing the right thing? Naess does try to meet this objection with his tenth principle: 10 There is nothing in human nature or essence, according to Spinoza, which can only manifest or express itself through injury to others. That is, the striving for expression of one's nature does not inevitably imply an attitude of hostile domination over other beings, human or non-human. **Violence, in the sense of violent activity, is not the same as violence as injury to others.**<sup>33</sup> **But "injury" is a human moral concept. There is no injury to others in neutral nature.** Naess and Spinoza are still bound by Judeo-Christian-Platonic-Aristotelian notions of human goodness. But to call for curbing man is like trying to make vegetarians of pet cats. I have often been puzzled about why so many environmental philosophers insist on harking to Spinoza as a ground for environmental ethics. It is perfectly plain as Curley<sup>34</sup> and Lloyd<sup>35</sup> point out that Spinoza's moral views are humanistic. They show how difficult it is to reconcile Spinoza's sense of freedom as the recognition of necessity with any notion of autonomy of self that is required to make moral imperatives or morality itself meaningful. That is, to recognize and accept what one is determined to do-even if this recognition and acceptance were not itself determined-is not the same as choosing between two equally possible (undetermined) courses of action. Moral action depends on free choice among undetermined alternatives.